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THE SUPREME COURT: MYTH AND REALITY.* By Arthur Selwyn
Miller. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1978. Pp., xvii, 388.
$19.95.

In The Supreme Court: Myth and Reality, Professor Miller of
George Washington University has gathered nine essays that he
wrote between 1960 and 1975. Miller's subject is a big one, as the
title of the book suggests. He examines the unique place of the
Supreme Court in the American political order, and tries to define
the proper bases of constitutional decision. As Miller himself says,
this broad view makes his perspective "basically different from most
other scholarship on the Supreme Court" (p. 9).
But Miller's work lends itself poorly to anthology. The earliest
essay, "The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication," is
the intellectual kernel of this book. The five other essays from the
1960s do little more than restate, with changes in emphasis, the
themes of "The Myth of Neutrality." Although any one of the six
might introduce Miller's thought appropriately, their ensemble is annoying - in this nine-course feast, the first six courses are all soups,
based on the same stock. Not only do the same ideas recur from
essay to essay; so does Miller's picturesque wording. For instance, in
four separate essays he accuses those who profess faith in judicial
neutrality of practicing "squid jurisprudence" (pp. 102, 128, 162-63,
234), hiding the truth about judicial creativity "behind a cloud of
impenetrable ink" (pp. ·128-29, 162-63, 234).
One advantage of such monotony, however, is that the principal
themes of the collection may be readily summarized. Miller's goal is
to create a replacement for the classical jurisprudence destroyed by
the legal realists. But first he endorses the realist tenets. The realists,
says Miller, discovered in the early part of this century that the
Supreme Court is different from other courts. Not even an ordinary
court is an automaton that derives the result in each case from precedent as a phonograph produces music from a record; the judges'
value preferences and the zeitgeist determine the result in close cases.
But since the Supreme Court's cases are all "close cases," the Court
never simply applies the law - it legislates, or at least renders decisions that are politically motivated. This "reality" contradicts the
myth, which Miller imputes to the lay public, that the Justices are
value-neutral technicians who deduce each result ineluctably from
the Co~titution.
Miller contends that public discourse about the Court should incorporate the insights of the realists, rather than preserve the old
* This book review was prepared by an Editor of the Michigan Law Review.-Ed.
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myth. He criticizes those scholars, notably Thurman Arnold, who
exhorted the legal community to preserve the illusion of a "rule of
law above men, evolved solely from Reason," 1 so that men would
not "lose themselves in an even greater illusion, the illusion that personal power can be benevolently exercised."2 Miller argues that we
need not choose between illusion and despotism; we can be realists
without being obscurantists. He approves the following passage (he
quotes it identically in two essays) from Morris Cohen's Law and the
Social Order, a passage which encapsulates Miller's approach:
[Some scholars argue that] while the contention that judges do have a
share in making the law is unanswerable, it is still advisable to keep the
fiction of the phonograph theory to prevent the law from becoming
more fluid than it already is. But I have an abiding conviction that to
recognize the truth and adjust oneself to it is in the end the easiest and
most advisable course. The phonograph theory has bred the mistaken
view that the law is a closed, independent system having nothing to do
with economic, political, social, or philosophical science. If, however,
we recognize that courts are constantly remaking the law, then it becomes of the utmost social importance that the law should be made in
accordance with the best available information, which it is the object of
science to supply.3

Miller thus accepts the work of the legal realists but says that we
must transcend their efforts. No longer can we content outselves
with pointing out that the Praetor has no robe; we must reclothe him
in twentieth-century costume.4
With this purpose, Miller proposes a new kind of jurisprudence:
"[t]he suggestion we make is for a teleologicaljurisprudence, one purposive in nature rather than 'impersonal' or 'neutral'" (p. 76, emphasis in original). But in Miller's new teleology, the goals recede before
our grasp. Since "the results of a process of 'reasoning' depend entirely upon what premises (ie., values) are used in that process" (p.
74), Miller suggests that every Justice "set out in explicit form his
value preferences as he understands them" (p. 74). Yet Miller concedes that "it is highly unlikely that any method of judicial opinionwriting can plainly and fully enunciate 'the real bases of decision' "
(p. 74).
If Miller cannot ·require judges to confess their legislative values
directly, he contents himself with an indirect route: he would have
"operational thinking become the outward rule, rather than the hidden actuality'' (p. 82). Judicial opinions, that is, should refer more
1. P. 86, quoting Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1311 (1960).
2. Id.
3. P. 87, quoting M, COHEN, The Process o:fJudicial Legislation, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL

380 n. 86. The same quotation appears at p. 129.
4. q: p. 100 ("The upshot is that it is high time for general acceptance of the fact that the
Emperor has no clothes.").
ORDER
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explicitly to "the effects of a given decision" (p. 82). This would help
create, he says, "a sociology of judicial decision-making" (p. 82).
"Disputes are and should avowedly be settled in terms of the external consequences of their application - with those consequences
spelled out in some degree of particularity" (p. 83). Judges should
evaluate these consequences "in terms of the realization or non-realization of stated societal values" (p. 83). But alas, "[w]hat those values might be, we do not now set forth" (p. 83).
Apparently feeling uncomfortable with a teleology completely
lacking goals, Miller recounts with approval two attempts to provide
a set of "societal values"; neither is credible. First, M.S. McDougal's
proposal for a law of "human dignity'' seems impossibly vaporous,
at least in Miller's one-paragraph summary. McDougal would have
judges seek "to promote the greatest production and widest possible
sharing, without discriminations irrelevant to merit, -of all values
among all human beings." 5 Second, Alexander Pekelis's·'jurisprudence of welfare" seems a thinly disguised tautology: "[a]lthough
welfare is 'an ambiguous concept,' 'it assumes as its end the ethical
and political ideals professed by our society and attempts to find in
the arsenals of judicial doctrine and social science the means for
their realization.' " 6
Finally, Miller seems to conclude that the search for goals, earlier
postponed and then shunted to other scholars, must now be abandoned:
A teleologically-oriented jurisprudence is not, it should be stressed,
a device to provide the answers to a given set of circumstances.
Rather, it is a method - a mode of inquiry, a way to approach constitutional questions. It is opposed to a mechanistic view of the social
and judicial processes. It seeks to provide purposive direction to the
fl.ow of social events. By asking the welfare or the human dignity question, the judge must think in terms of consequences and will help in
providing some guiding lights for the attainment of the democratic
ideal. [P. 85.]

Miller's teleology is thus a call for purposiveness-without-a-purpose.
It stands only in opposition to mechanistic theories of jurisprudence,
and requires those theories as a polemical prop.
Robert G. McCloskey's general criticism of the excesses of legal
realist thought could as easily have been directed specifically at
Miller's extension of the realist approach:
[Some] "[l]egal realists," impressed by the discovery that the Supreme
Court [is] more than a court, [are] sometimes prone to treat it as if it
were not a court at all, as if its "courthood" were a pure fa«?de for
5. P. 83, quoting McDougal, Perspectives far an International Law of Human Dignity, 53
AM. SocY. INTL. L. PROCEEDINGS 107 (1959).
6. P. 84, quoting A. PEKELIS, The CasefaraJurisprudenceof We!fare, in LAW AND SOCIAL
ACTION 33, 37 (1950).
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political functions indistinguishable from those performed by the legislature. Such a view bypasses everything that is really interesting about
the- institution. . . .
. . . The Court's claim on the American mind derives from the
myth of an impartial, judicious tribunal whose duty it is to preserve
our sense of continuity with the fundamental law.7

For McCloskey, the myths surrounding the Court have arisen out of
an inherent contradiction: the Court must preserve both the ideal of
the rule of law above men and the ideal of popular political sovereignty. To end the myth would be "to align the judicial power
squarely with the legislative power and to erase the differentiation of
function that is the Court's basis for being." 8 Miller ignores these
subtleties and defines myths simply as "erroneous or false" beliefs
that hide the unambiguous "reality" (p. 14). But if, in fact, myths
continue to shape our thoughts and actions despite our doubts about
their ultimate truth, legal scholars should try to understand why
myths persist before they propose, as Miller does, that we renounce
them.
One must admit, however, that Miller asks fundamental questions, and asks them in a lively manner sure to continue the debate
about the Court's place in government. Perhaps, ultimately, we can
excuse Miller's impatience with ambiguity; it may serve as a necessary antidote to complacency. And in later essays, he has moved
beyond the debate about neutral principles. Chapter seven calls for
more sociological evaluation of the effects of the Court's work.
Chapter eight criticizes the adversary process as an inadequate
means of channeling technical information to the court. Chapter
nine examines what Miller sees as "a diminution in the confidence
people have in judges" (p. 315). Chapter Ten concludes that the
Court protects the right of privacy "only when the fundamental interests of the State are not jeopardized" (p. 343). These later essays
abandon the rhetoric of teleology; instead they acknowledge the
problems of a judiciary required to perform legislative functions.
One only wishes that Professor Miller had compressed the arguments of his earlier essays into one or two brief chapters. Instead of
making vague exhortations for a purposive decision-making, he
might have studied the institutional constraints that have produced
the existing "myth." His later work would have benefited from such
a study. His book would have been slimmer, but more compelling.
7. R. MCCLOSKEY,
8. Id. at 21.

THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT
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